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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence regarding the proper standard of protection for the free
exercise of religion is complicated. In determining how the First
Amendment speaks to situations in which generally applicable health,
welfare, and safety laws incidentally or accidentally burden certain
individuals' religious practices, the Court has vacillated between
different standards and different extremes, overruling itself several
times. Early on, the Court held that, provided the government did not
interfere deliberately with religion for religious reasons, an
inadvertent interference with religious practice raised no Free
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Exercise Clause problem,' "no matter how trivial the state's
nonreligious objectives, and no matter how many alternative
approaches were available to the state to pursue its objectives with
less impact on religion."2
That doctrine soon was overruled, 3 and a series of cases from
the 1960s through the '80s, known as the Sherbert4 line, or the
Sherbert-Yoder5 line, established that even generally applicable
health, welfare, and safety regulations could be struck down if their
burden on religious practice, however accidental, did not meet certain
constitutional requirements. The Sherbert line of cases boldly asserted
that for a law of general applicability to bind religious objectors, the
state must demonstrate a "compelling state interest."6
Yet, the rhetoric of the Sherbert line notwithstanding, rather
than employing a "compelling state interest" test or "strict scrutiny"-
both names for the most demanding standard of judicial review-the
Court in fact was applying an intermediate and more refined level of
scrutiny. The Court balanced the state's regulatory interest against
the burden imposed on the religious adherent's practices, accounting
for (albeit subconsciously or implicitly) the availability of alternative
means for both parties. As a result, later cases in the Sherbert line
declined even to employ the language of "compelling state interest" or
"strict scrutiny."7 As the Sherbert line progressed, the Court moved
ever closer to the recognition that the appropriate approach to
accidental interference cases was a simple balancing test.
But the earlier cases' invocation of the compelling interest test,
despite the fact that another standard was in fact being applied,
resulted in the Sherbert line ultimately being overruled in the case of
1. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
2. Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech and Religion
Clause Cases, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1346 (1995).
3. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
4. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
5. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
6. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 ("We must next consider whether some compelling state
interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the
substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right."); see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215
('The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion.").
7. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988)
("Respondents contend that the burden on their religious practices is heavy enough to violate the
Free Exercise Clause unless the Government can demonstrate a compelling need to... engage in
timber harvesting in the Chimney Rock area. We disagree."); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707
(1986) ("The test applied in cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder is not appropriate in this setting."
(internal citation omitted)).
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Employment Division v. Smith.8 The Smith Court, taking Sherbert at
its word, found that the compelling interest test was an impermissibly
strict constitutional bar for the state to meet* should any law
incidentally burden an individual's religious practice. 9 Ignoring the
fact that the Sherbert line had not in fact applied a true strict scrutiny
standard, and mischaracterizing cases in which the religious objector
had prevailed to avoid explicitly overruling prior cases, the Court held
that accidental interferences with religion posed no Free Exercise
problem and that the state was not required to meet strict scrutiny, or
any level of scrutiny for that matter.10
Frustrated with Smith, Congress enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")" to overrule the Supreme Court
and reinstate what it apparently thought was the "compelling
interest" test as set forth in Sherbert and Yoder.12 In City of Boerne v.
Flores, however, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as it applied
to state laws, marking a severe setback for RFRA in terms of
reinstating pre-Smith law.1 3 But because the Court based its decision
to strike down the law upon principles of federalism, 14 Boerne left open
the possibility that RFRA remained constitutional as applied to
federal laws. That possibility was recently affirmed in Gonzales v. 0
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, which sustained a
RFRA defense against the federal Controlled Substances Act. 15
Likewise, a substantial number of states have attempted to counteract
Smith by enacting their own "mini-RFRAs," many of these modeled
after the federal RFRA.
Still, enormous unanswered definitional ambiguities exist with
respect to RFRA. For example, how does one interpret a statute that
purports to reinstate a "compelling interest" test as embodied in cases
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. Id. at 888.
10. Id. at 878 ("It is a permissible reading of the text... to say that if prohibiting the
exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object... but merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment
has not been offended.").
11. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is commonly referred to as RFRA ("riff-ra").
12. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000)).
13. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
14. Id. at 536.
15. 546 U.S. 418 (2006). Prior to this case, several Courts of Appeals had already affirmed
RFRA's continued validity with respect to federal law. See, e.g., O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons,
349 F.3d 399, 400-01 (7th Cir. 2003); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1220-22 (9th Cir. 2002);
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958-60 (10th Cir. 2001); Christians v. Crystal Evangelical
Free Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 858-63 (8th Cir. 1998). It was not, however, until 0
Centra Espirita that the Supreme Court had occasion to finally answer the question.
20081 1029
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that do not actually set forth a compelling interest test? Or, how does
one interpret a statute that attempts to overrule a case that itself
overruled previous case law by mischaracterizing it and setting up a
straw man?
This Note attempts to answer these questions. More precisely,
this Note advances the argument that a true compelling interest test
is inappropriately extreme for accidental interference cases, that the
Court had arrived at a more reasonable intermediate balancing test in
the Sherbert line of cases, 16 and that, for all of the linguistic
inaccuracies in both that line of cases and RFRA, RFRA codified the
intermediate balancing approach of the Sherbert line. This Note
further argues that the compelling governmental interest test is so
extreme and untenable that it only invites a backlash of the kind seen
in Smith. This backlash aims not to lower the constitutional bar for
accidental interference to a more reasonable balancing approach, but
to deny that the government need demonstrate any particularly strong
regulatory interest to justify such burdens. The ironic result is that
religious claimants ultimately stand to gain the most protection for
their religious liberty by pushing for an interpretation of RFRA that
would require a lower standard of protection, not a higher one. Hence,
religious interest groups would be wise to steer RFRA's interpretation
in both the federal arena and in the states' mini-RFRAs, toward the
refined, reasonable, and nuanced approach of Sherbert and its
progeny. Such an interpretation is not merely advantageous to
religious claimants, but also finds ample support in the text of the
statute, as this Note will demonstrate.
Part II of this Note details the history of the Court's free
exercise jurisprudence. It shows how the Court came to a workable
solution to the problem of accidental interference in the Sherbert line
of cases, how and why that line of cases was overruled in Smith, and
how Congress responded by enacting RFRA. Part III provides several
arguments for an interpretation of RFRA that is more consistent with
the methodology actually employed in the Sherbert line, as opposed to
a strict scrutiny standard, and examines the Court's adherence to
such an interpretation in 0 Centra Espirita, its first encounter with
RFRA since the statute's partial demise in Boerne. Finally, Part IV
emphasizes the importance of a moderate interpretation of RFRA in
securing lasting protection for religious interests.
16. This observation has been made already by several commentators. See, e.g., Robert D.
Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (1987);
William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 69 MINN.
L. REV. 545 (1983); McCoy, supra note 2; G. Michael McCrossin, Note, General Laws, Neutral
Principles, and the Free Exercise Clause, 33 VAND. L. REV. 149 (1980).
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II. HISTORY
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "17
In free exercise jurisprudence, deliberate interference with religious
beliefs or practices has not posed much of a problem. Statutes that
deliberately attempt to suppress religious belief or practice are almost
never enacted,18 and those that are enacted are unequivocally struck
down as unconstitutional. 19  On the other hand, the Court has
struggled mightily to resolve the problem of what might be called
"accidental interference." Accidental interference occurs when the
government, whether federal, state, or local, enacts a law of general
applicability that, although meant to advance a secular purpose,
incidentally burdens an individual's or group's religious practice. 20 In
this area of the law, as one commentator notes, "the Court has
adopted one fundamental doctrinal construct, promptly overruled that
construct, adopted a nearly opposite principle, and then years later
resurrected the original principle."21 This Part traces the history of the
Court's approach to the problem and identifies important patterns
therein.
A. Resolving Accidental Interference Before Smith
This Note is concerned primarily with three periods or events
in the history of free exercise jurisprudence: (1) the Sherbert v. Verner
era, (2) the Employment Division v. Smith decision overruling
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
18. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 577 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (recognizing that occasions on which the government explicitly
targets religion are rare); Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide
to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994).
19. See City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting the ritual
slaughter of animals on the grounds that the ordinance, while facially neutral, was a deliberate
attempt to target practitioners of the Santeria faith); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)
(invalidating a Tennessee provision that prohibited clergy from being legislators or constitutional
convention delegates); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (striking down a Maryland law
requiring that all holders of public office declare their belief in the existence of God, using the
Free Exercise Clause rather than the Establishment Clause).
20. A common alternative formulation of the problem is to ask whether and to what degree
the Constitution requires "exemptions" from generally applicable regulatory schemes. See, e.g.,
William P. Marshall, The Case against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption,
40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1990); Eugene Volokh, A Common Law Model for Religious
Exemptions, 46 UCLAL. REV. 1465 (1999).
21. McCoy, supra note 2, at 1335.
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Sherbert, and (3) the congressional response to Smith: RFRA.
Nevertheless, a brief overview of Sherbert's predecessors may be
helpful for putting Sherbert into historical context.
1. Cases before Sherbert
The Court first attempted to resolve problems of interference
with religious exercise using the now-defunct "belief-action"
dichotomy. 22 In Reynolds v. United States, decided in 1878, the Court
upheld application of a federal law proscribing bigamy against the free
exercise defense of a Mormon who claimed that polygamy was his
religious duty. 23 The Court reasoned that while Congress was deprived
of all legislative power over religious beliefs, it remained free to reach
actions that were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order.24 To allow otherwise, the Court stated, would be "to permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself."25
While such a distinction between the realms of thought and
action provided a workable standard that was certainly elegant in its
simplicity and logically defensible, it suffered from one critical
shortcoming. It did not prohibit the government from deliberately
interfering with religion, provided its regulations pertained solely to
religious conduct and not to religious belief.26 Therefore, the Court
abandoned the belief-action distinction in favor of the more nuanced
"deliberate-inadvertent" distinction in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis.27 Gobitis held that deliberate state interference with religion
was per se unconstitutional, whereas inadvertent interference with
religion in pursuit of a secular state objective raised no free exercise
problem. 28 This standard seemed to preserve the result in Reynolds-
the state could not plausibly intrude upon religious belief for an
allegedly secular purpose-but it also served to protect the religious
adherent from any state effort to undermine his or her devotion
through the prohibition of religious conduct that could not be
explained on grounds other than underlying religious animus. Yet, the
deliberate-inadvertent distinction itself suffered from a defect.
22. Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989).
23. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
24. Id. at 164.
25. Id. at 167.
26. McCoy, supra note 2, at 1345 ("It is apparent that the legislature could regulate
religious conduct, such as worship services, for no reason other than the legislature's religious
preference in the choice of acceptable conduct.").
27. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
28. McCoy, supra note 2, at 1346.
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Provided that burdens placed on religious conduct by generally
applicable laws were truly accidental, such inadvertence was
sufficient to withstand attack on free exercise grounds "no matter how
trivial the state's nonreligious objectives, and no matter how many
alternative approaches were available to the state to pursue its
objectives with less impact on religion."29
Recognizing the shortcomings of this approach, the Court
overruled Gobitis only three years later in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette and suggested that even inadvertent
legislative interferences with religion must withstand some
constitutional scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause.30 What level
of constitutional scrutiny such legislation must meet, however, was
not specified until 1963, when the Court decided the seminal case of
Sherbert v. Verner.31 Sherbert not only addressed the issue head-on,
but also established the language, and hence the standard to be
employed, in accidental interference cases. For this reason, although it
had its genesis in Barnette, this period of free exercise jurisprudence is
commonly associated with Sherbert and the cases following it.
2. Sherbert, Yoder, and the Introduction of the "Compelling State
Interest" Test
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court held unconstitutional South
Carolina's denial of unemployment compensation to a Seventh-Day
Adventist on account of her refusal to accept jobs that would require
her to work on Saturdays. 32 The Court reasoned that the applicant's
ineligibility to receive benefits derived solely from the practice of her
religion, and that this ineligibility put pressure on her to forgo the
practice of her religion in order to receive such benefits. The Court
concluded that the governmental imposition of such a choice imposed
the same kind of free exercise burden as would a fine against her for
worshiping on Saturday.33
29. Id.
30. 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (stating that, under due process, while a State may regulate a
public utility merely upon a "rational basis," when those restrictions concern First Amendment
guarantees, they are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to
interests which the State may lawfully protect).
31. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
32. Id. at 399-402.
33. Id. at 404. In so holding, the Court was adhering to a doctrine commonly known as the
"unconstitutional conditions doctrine." The doctrine basically provides that the government may
not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if
the government may withhold that benefit altogether. While simply stated, the doctrine is
anything but straightforward in practice, and courts and commentators have never fully and
2008] 1033
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In so holding, however, the Court faced a potential charge of
inconsistency, as its decision seemed at tension with the case of
Braunfeld v. Brown, decided only two years prior. In Braunfeld, the
Court dismissed objections by Jewish business owners to a mandatory
Sunday closing law.34 The appellants argued that because their
religion required them to remain closed on Saturdays as well, they
faced unfair competition from non-Jewish businesses, which could
remain open an additional day per week.35 The Court nevertheless
upheld the statute, reasoning that the state had an interest in
maintaining a uniform "day of rest" throughout the city- an interest
that would otherwise be thwarted by allowing an exemption for
religious purposes.3 6
Although the burden on free exercise in Sherbert seemed
similar to that in Braunfeld, the Sherbert Court distinguished
Braunfeld on the ground that the government had there prevailed by
demonstrating a sufficiently strong state interest.37 Setting forth the
proper standard under which such burdens on religious liberty were to
be evaluated, the Court stated,
We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility
provisions of the ... statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First
Amendment right. It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly constitutional area, "only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation."
3 8
The term "compelling state interest" is, of course, a reference to
the "compelling interest test," or "strict scrutiny" standard, of judicial
review. 39 When a court evaluates a law under strict scrutiny, the
government must satisfy two prongs. First, it must demonstrate that
satisfactorily articulated when and how the doctrine should apply. See generally Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
34. 366 U.S. 599, 599-601, 609 (1961).
35. Id. at 601.
36. Id. at 608 ("[T]o permit the exemption might well undermine the State's goal of
providing a day that, as best possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and
activity.").
37. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408 ("[T]he statute [in Braunfeld] was nevertheless saved by a
countervailing factor which finds no equivalent in the instant case-a strong state interest in
providing one uniform day of rest for all workers.").
38. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (emphasis added))
(internal citation omitted).
39. The following discussion of strict scrutiny relies heavily on Adam Winkler's Fatal in
Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59
VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
1034 [Vol. 61:3:1027
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the law advances a "compelling" governmental purpose. 40 This inquiry
refers to the "societal importance of the government's reasons for
enacting the challenged law."4 1  Second, the government must
demonstrate that the law is "narrowly tailored,"42 or is the "least
restrictive means,"43 to achieve that interest. In other words, the law
must be neither over- nor underinclusive.
As a form of heightened scrutiny-in contrast to the openly
deferential "rational basis" standard-strict scrutiny is generally
thought to have its genesis in the 1938 case of United States v.
Carolene Products, which suggested in its famous "footnote 4," that
laws appearing to be within specific constitutional prohibitions or
discriminating against "discrete and insular minorities" might
properly be subject to a "more searching judicial inquiry."44 Consistent
with this formulation, strict scrutiny found its paradigm application in
cases of racial classification and discrimination. 45 Over time, it was
extended to cover invasions of so-called "fundamental rights," 46
40. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) ("We have held that all racial
classifications imposed by government 'must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny.' This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored to further compelling governmental interests." (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))).
41. Hans A. Linde, lWho Must Know What, When, and How: The Systemic Incoherence of
"Interest" Scrutiny, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219 (Stephen E. Gottlied ed.,
1993).
42. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 530.
43. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
44. 304 U.S. 114, 152 n.4 (1938).
45. See Berg, supra note 18, at 32 (" 'Strict scrutiny' has mostly been applied in cases of
government discrimination, whether between people of different races (under the Fourteenth
Amendment) or between the content of ideas (under the Free Speech Clause)."); Winkler, supra
note 39 ("The motive theory of strict scrutiny has its most profound impact in equality cases
.... ").
46. There are actually two ways in which the Court has found that the burdening of
"fundamental rights" may occur. The first, under the doctrine of "substantive due process," is
when a law directly burdens a particular "fundamental" right for everyone who may possess the
right. Compare Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (interpreting Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), as classifying an individual's decision whether to bear or beget a child as
"fundamental," and therefore subjecting restrictions on contraceptives to strict scrutiny), with
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110 (1989) (declining to recognize as "fundamental" the
visitation rights of a biological father to a child born of an adulterous affair, and therefore
subjecting restrictions thereof to the lenient rational basis standard of review). Second, under
Equal Protection jurisprudence, an otherwise non-suspect classification may be subjected to
strict scrutiny if the classification concerns the exercise of a "fundamental" right. See, e.g.,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) ("Since our past decisions make clear that the right
to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here significantly
interferes with the exercise of that right, we believe that 'critical examination' of the state
interests advanced in support of the classification is required."); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (subjecting the selective distribution of the franchise to strict
scrutiny).
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content-based restrictions on free speech, 47 and, in Sherbert, incidental
burdens on the free exercise of religion.
Strict scrutiny generally is the most demanding standard of
judicial review that a federal court will apply. Thus, the Supreme
Court has often referred to it as "the most exacting scrutiny"48 or as
"the most stringent level of review."49 The late Gerald Gunther's
famous characterization of strict scrutiny as "strict in theory, fatal in
fact"50 has become one of the most famous statements in constitutional
law, 51 having been quoted approvingly even by the Court itself.52
As Professor Adam Winkler describes it,
Under this approach, the court weighs the costs of a law in terms of its impact on
individual rights against the law's benefits to society as a whole. But this is a weighted
balancing, with a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the individual rights claimant,
and the government is unlikely to win absent especially pressing circumstances.
53
Outside the free exercise context, the Court 54 has deemed only
a few governmental interests "compelling." These include remedying
the past effects of governmental discrimination;5 5 preventing sex
discrimination;5 6 enhancing student body diversity in the higher
education setting;57 preserving the integrity of the state election
process; 58 shielding minors from the influence of sexually explicit,
although short of obscene, literature;59 ensuring that "criminals do not
47. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
48. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007);
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
49. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980).
50. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
51. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Gerald Gunther: The Man and the Scholar, 55 STAN. L. REV. 643,
645 (2002).
52. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 n.6 (1984); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring). But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (again
protesting Gunther's characterization); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'
(quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519)).
53. Winkler, supra note 39, at 803 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
54. The following list enumerates only those interests that the Supreme Court has deemed
"compelling," leaving out the significant number of additional "compelling interests" that lower
courts have recognized.
55. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Local 28 of the Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 480 (1986) (plurality opinion).
56. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
57. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 307.
58. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992); Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989).
59. See Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968).
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profit from their crimes"; 60 and preventing vote-buying. 61 Given the
apparent magnitude of the foregoing interests, it is not surprising that
the Court has deemed these interests "compelling," while excluding
lesser interests, such as administrative efficiency.6 2
The Court's decision in Sherbert to expand the application of
strict scrutiny to restrictions on free exercise was not surprising. After
all, by 1963, strict scrutiny had well been in play in evaluating free
speech and freedom of association restrictions. 63 What was surprising,
however, was that, unlike the Court's free speech jurisprudence,
Sherbert extended strict scrutiny to accidental interferences with free
exercise. Prior free speech cases had distinguished between deliberate
and accidental interferences with speech.
Schneider v. New Jersey (Town of Irvington)64 and Kovacs v.
Cooper65 provide early examples of the distinction in the speech
context. In Schneider, several communities forbade the distribution of
leaflets, arguing that such flat bans were necessary to prevent
littering.6 6 The prevention of littering, of course, constituted a non-
speech interest. The state was not deliberately attempting to curb the
speech of those who would distribute leaflets, and thus the
interference with speech was merely accidental, in the form of a "time,
place, or manner" restriction. 67 Nonetheless, the Court held that the
communities could accomplish their interests in a less restrictive
manner by simply punishing those who actually threw paper on the
streets, and therefore struck down the law.68
60. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
119 (1991).
61. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 119 (2003); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-28 (1976).
62. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 508 (1989); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 691 (1977); Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 n.9 (1972);
see also McCoy, supra note 2, at 1348 n.44 ("[I]t is axiomatic that financial concerns never rise to
the level of a 'compelling interest.' ").
63. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); see also Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling
State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=934795 (arguing that, despite common opinion, the compelling state
interest test had its genesis not in Equal Protection claims, but in First Amendment cases of the
1950s and early 1960s).
64. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
65. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
66. 308 U.S. at 153-59.
67. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) ("Expression,
whether oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner
restrictions.").
68. Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162.
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In Kovacs, the Court came out the other way. Kovacs concerned
a ban on the use of sound trucks (loud speakers on vehicles) upon
public streets. 69 Once again, the interference with speech was
incidental; the state was not trying to censor any messages that might
be amplified from the loud speaker, but was concerned merely with
preventing loud sounds.70 The Court upheld the ordinance, reasoning
that the state had a valid interest in the protection of tranquility and
freedom from nuisance.7 1 Moreover, the Court reasoned that those
prohibited from disseminating their ideas by sound trucks had
alternative avenues of expression.7 2 Thus, just as Schneider
considered the towns' alternative means of accomplishing their
interests, Kovacs took into account the speakers' alternative means of
advancing their message.
Subsequent cases, such as United States v. O'Brien73 and Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,74 further developed this
framework for resolving instances of accidental interference with
speech. As a result, a nuanced form of balancing emerged in which
courts balanced (1) the state's interests, (2) in light of the state's viable
alternatives to accomplish its interests, against (3) the speaker's
interests in the expression of his message, (4) in light of available
alternative avenues for advancing his ideas. 75
Thus, in free speech jurisprudence, the line was clearly drawn:
deliberate restrictions on speech were subject to strict scrutiny;
accidental restrictions on speech were subject only to an intermediate
balancing of the interests at stake. This dichotomy seems reasonable;
not only do deliberate interferences with speech seem less compatible
with guarantees of free speech, but the application of strict scrutiny to
cases of accidental interferences with speech would produce absurd
results.
Consider the following hypothetical. Suppose a state law
prohibits public nudity. While the state may be concerned solely with
public aesthetics, a non-speech interest, such a ban might interfere
inadvertently with a nudist's means of expressing herself, a speech
69. 336 U.S. at 78-79.
70. Id. at 82-83.
71. Id. at 83.
72. Id. at 88-89 ("That more people may be more easily and cheaply reached by sound
trucks... is not enough to call forth constitutional protection for what those charged with public
welfare reasonably think is a nuisance when easy means of publicity are open.... There is no
restriction upon the communication of ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice, by
newspapers, by pamphlets, by dodgers." (emphasis added)).
73. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
74. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
75. See McCoy, supra note 2, at 1361-62 (setting forth this four-factor method of balancing).
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interest. Employing a balancing standard, a court would evaluate the
state's strong, but certainly not compelling, interest in public
aesthetics against the nudist's interest in expressing herself,
accounting for both parties' alternatives. Applying strict scrutiny,
however, almost certainly would result in the nudist prevailing, as a
state interest in aesthetics would hardly be sufficiently compelling to
justify, say, a racial classification scheme, or the burdening of a
"fundamental right."
For this reason, the Court's invocation of strict scrutiny in
Sherbert seems incorrect. The Court was not wrong to require a state
exemption for an applicant's religiously based refusal to work on
Saturdays. Rather, it was the Court's invocation of the highly exacting
"compelling interest" standard of protection, where a lesser standard
of protection would have sufficed to reach a similar outcome, that
raises serious concerns. If one assumes that interests deemed
''compelling" in one area of the law may be deemed similarly
"compelling" in other areas, it is significant that Sherbert
distinguished the contrary holding in Braunfeld on the ground that
the government had justified burdens on free exercise by
demonstrating a "compelling state interest." For it would be absurd to
classify Braunfeld's interest in a uniform day of rest as "compelling"
under classic strict scrutiny. Once again, imagine such a justification
being proffered for a state-imposed racial classification scheme or the
burdening of a "fundamental right." Because a mere interest in
uniformity could not overcome abridgements of these constitutional
rights, such a decision would represent a remarkable diminishment in
protection.
On the other hand, assuming a parallelism between the Court's
free speech and free exercise jurisprudence, the Clark-OBrien
balancing calculus could have informed the Court's judgment, its
choice of language notwithstanding. Such an assumption would have
been justifiable from the facts of Sherbert. While the burden on the
petitioner was substantial-her religion expressly forbade her from
working on "the Sabbath"-the state's interest in denying
compensation to applicants willing to work every day but Saturday
was minimal, as evidenced by the state's Sunday exemption. 76 Hence,
Sherbert's "compelling state interest" language may have meant no
more than that the state must demonstrate an interest that is simply
substantial enough to outweigh the burden imposed on religious
practice. In other words, perhaps the Court was engaging in the
76. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
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balancing inherent in strict scrutiny, only without any thumb on the
scale.
Yet, nine years later, in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, the
Court continued in its use of superlative language. In Yoder, the Court
struck down the fine and conviction of an Amish man who refused, on
religious grounds, to send his fifteen-year-old daughter to school after
she had completed the eighth grade, in violation of Wisconsin's
requirement of school attendance until age sixteen.77 The Court held
that such a regulation unduly burdened the religious practices of the
Amish, and struck down the fine and conviction as unconstitutional
under the Free Exercise Clause.78 In so holding, the Yoder Court relied
on Sherbert for the proposition that the State's interest in compulsory
education laws must be balanced against the religious interests of the
Amish.79 However, in articulating the standard supposedly set forth in
Sherbert, the Yoder Court boldly stated, "The essence of all that has
been said and written [concerning accidental interferences with
religion] is that only those'interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion."80 If there remained any question as to what standard of
scrutiny the Court intended to apply in accidental interference cases,
Yoder effectively answered it. The Court's reference to state interests
"of the highest order" described a requisite strength of the
governmental interest on par with the compelling interest standard
employed in other areas of constitutional law. And the Court's use of
the phrase "not otherwise served" seemed to encapsulate the means-fit
requirement that the law be narrowly tailored.
Yet, if strict scrutiny were the standard to be applied, it is
again difficult to understand how the state's interest in a uniform day
of rest in Braunfeld was an interest "of the highest order." Moreover,
as in Sherbert, the Yoder Court did not need to employ strict scrutiny
to reach its result. While the burden on the religious practices of the
Amish was substantial-compulsory secular indoctrination in public
schools that contradicted the Amish community's religious
teachings 8 1-the state's regulatory interest in an additional year of
education for a near-adult was trivial at best.8 2 Thus, the Yoder Court
simply could have found that the state's interest was not sufficiently
77. 406 U.S. 205, 207-08 (1972).
78. Id. at 234.
79. Id. at 215.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 210-11.
82. See id. at 222
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substantial (in contrast to a "compelling" requirement) to outweigh the
consequent burden on religious practice. But despite the fact that both
Sherbert and Yoder could have reached the same outcomes under a
less onerous intermediate scrutiny standard or a balancing test, both
cases were taken at their word as adopting the compelling
governmental interest test as the standard for resolving accidental
interference claims.
3. Sherbert's Progeny-Refining the Standard
After Sherbert and Yoder, claims for constitutionally mandated
religious exemptions from laws of general applicability continued to
succeed in cases involving state unemployment compensation.8 3
Claimants outside of this context did not fare as well. Although the
next Supreme Court cases to apply the Sherbert-Yoder rule outside of
the unemployment context-United States v. Lee84 and Bob Jones
University v. United States85-followed suit in purporting to employ
strict scrutiny in cases of accidental interference, they too cast doubt
on the requirement of a true compelling governmental interest test.
In United States v. Lee, the Court rejected the free exercise
claim of an Amish employer who refused to pay the required share of
his employees' social security taxes.86 Noting that "the Amish believe
it sinful not to provide for their own elderly and needy and therefore
are religiously opposed to the national social security system," the
Court recognized a conflict between the Amish faith and the federal
obligation. Yet, the Court did not articulate clearly the appropriate
standard of review for such a case. Citing Sherbert, it stated, "The
state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is
essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."
Nonetheless, the Court upheld the imposition of the tax under that
standard, reasoning that it would be difficult to accommodate the
social security system if it allowed "myriad exceptions flowing from a
83. See Frazee v. Ill. Dept. of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 829 (1989) (further extending
Sherbert to protect an applicant whose religious motive for refusing to work on Sunday derived
solely from his basic Christian beliefs, despite his lack of affiliation with any particular sect or
church); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 136-37 (1987)
(extending Sherbert to the case of an employee whose religious beliefs had changed in the course
of his employment); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 707
(1981) (striking down the denial of unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness on account of
his voluntarily quitting his job in a munitions factory, because he had resigned due to religious
objections to war).
84. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
85. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
86. For relevant facts of the case, see 455 U.S. at 254-60.
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wide variety of beliefs." It reasoned that such a policy would allow
similar objections to the imposition of taxes by those who object on
religious grounds to activities, such as war, that the government may
fund with those taxes.
What standard of review was the Court applying? Although the
language chosen-"essential to accomplish an overriding interest"-is
not entirely clear, the requirement that the interest be "overriding'.'
intimates the necessity of a particularly strong governmental interest,
and the requirement of essentiality seems to foreclose other, less
restrictive means of accomplishing that interest. This, coupled with
the Court's subsequent citations to Yoder and Sherbert, strongly
suggests that the Court was in fact invoking the demanding strict
scrutiny standard.
But even the compelling interest test was not necessary to
reach the same result. While it is true that the state's regulatory
interest in uniform taxation was high,8 7 the alleged burden on the
petitioner's religion was decidedly minimal. While the Amish may
believe in providing for the elderly, the petitioner here was in no way
prohibited from providing for his elderly by imposition of the social
security tax. Rather, his complaint seems to have been that the money
he provided in the form of a tax to the government would be
distributed to non-Amish elderly, and that this government-provided
subsistence might in some cases cause the relatives of those non-
Amish elderly recipients to neglect to provide for their elderly. Such a
convoluted articulation of the causal connection illustrates how
attenuated it was. If the government's requirement burdened the
Amish man's religion, it was one of the slightest burdens conceivable.
Hence, the Court did not need to bring out the heavy machinery of
strict scrutiny to uphold the imposition of the tax; it merely needed to
demonstrate that the state's regulatory interest outweighed the
accidental interference with the petitioner's religion, hardly a difficult
task.
In Bob Jones, the Court upheld the denial of tax-exempt status
to two small religious colleges that prohibited interracial dating
among students, a policy that allegedly accorded with the religious
beliefs of the institutions.88 Finding that the government had a
sufficiently "compelling" interest in "eradicating racial discrimination
87. Id. at 258-59 ("[T]he Government's interest in assuring mandatory and continuous
participation in and contribution to the social security system is very high.").
88. 461 U.S. 574, 579-81 (1983).
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in education," the Court sustained the withdrawal of tax-exempt
status against the universities' free exercise objections.8 9
Whatever the degree of the burden on religious practice
imposed by the IRS policy at issue, the Court's automatic acceptance
of the government's interest in eradicating racism in private education
as "compelling" raises certain interpretive problems. Although, the
Court has recognized the eradication of racism as a compelling
interest, it has done so only in the context of governmental
discrimination. 90 The Court has declined to recognize a governmental
interest in remedying private discrimination as "compelling," and has
struck down affirmative action policies that employ racial
classifications and content-based speech restrictions under strict
scrutiny for that reason.91 Its promotion to "compelling" status solely
in the area of free exercise therefore is confusing. 92 As one
commentator notes, "If we are to take the compelling interest test
seriously in this context, it is quite surprising that the Court found a
compelling governmental interest in the dating policies of a small
religious college. '93 Perhaps the only expldnation is that, once again,
the Court was not employing traditional strict scrutiny.
Such doubts only continued when, in the late 1980s, the Court
decided four more accidental interference cases-Goldman v.
Weinberger,94 OLone v. Estate of Shabazz,95 Bowen v. Roy, 96 and Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n97-- all of which
expressly declined to invoke strict scrutiny. In Goldman, an Air Force
psychologist was disciplined for wearing a yarmulke, in violation of
89. Id. at 603-04.
90. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1989).
91. See id. at 499 (striking down a municipal requirement that private contractors on city
projects subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of the contract to one or more
minority businesses when there was no evidence that the city had ever participated in the
alleged private discrimination in subcontracting); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768-70 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 200-02 (1995); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
389-90 (1992) (holding content-based restrictions on private racist speech unconstitutional on the
grounds of impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
92. Without going into detailed analysis, neither does it seem that the government played a
role in encouraging the private discrimination, under the current "state action" doctrine. See
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (requiring that there be a "sufficiently
close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity [before] the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself'); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972) (same).
93. McCoy, supra note 2, at 1371.
94. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
95. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
96. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
97. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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the military's uniform dress regulations barring the wearing of
headgear indoors. 98 The petitioner sought an exemption, arguing that
the case should be analyzed "under the standard enunciated in
Sherbert [and Yoder]." Instead, deeming the military a separate,
"specialized society," the Court applied a "far more deferential"
standard of review. It reasoned that greater deference was
appropriate in the military context because, to accomplish its mission,
the military must foster "instinctive obedience, unity, commitment,
and esprit de corps." The military asserted that standardized uniforms
encouraged "the subordination of personal preferences and identities
in favor of the overall group mission." Under this openly deferential
standard of review, the Court found the government interest sufficient
to justify the burden on the petitioner's religious practice. In Shabazz,
the Court similarly deferred to prison policies that prevented a
Muslim inmate from attending a midday service. 99 Moreover, it
expressly rejected the view that prison officials have the burden of
disproving available alternatives. 100
Thus, Goldman and Shabazz, both in the Sherbert line of cases,
and both purporting adherence to Sherbert, expressly declined to
employ the compelling governmental interest test. Both decisions were
predicated on the peculiar characteristics of the environments. That
is, the Court carved out special, formalistic categories meriting a more
lenient standard of review. But no such formalism was required. The
fact that the military needed to foster "instinctive obedience," or the
subordination of personal preferences in favor of the group, was
merely another way of saying that the government's regulatory
interest in the military context was particularly high. The same could
be said of the prison context, in which the state has a very strong
regulatory interest in maintaining strict schedules for inmates, in
light of the inherent danger attending prisoner mobility. Viewing the
governmental interests in this manner, it once again becomes
apparent that both decisions could have reflected the same result had
the Court employed a simple balancing test of the type employed
O'Brien and Clark in the free speech context. 10 1
Roy and Lyng, on the other hand, declined to employ strict
scrutiny for an entirely different reason. Rather than recognize special
sui generis categories for the governmental interests at stake, the
Court seemed to create the additional rule that burdens resulting from
98. For the relevant facts of this case, see 475 U.S. at 505-10.
99. 482 U.S. at 344-45.
100. Id. at 350 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987)).
101. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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the government's choice in regulating its own procedures or property
would not be subject to the Sherbert- Yoder test. In Roy, the petitioners
objected to the requirement that welfare recipients be assigned and
identified by a social security number, arguing that the assignment of
a number to their two-year-old daughter, "Little Bird of Snow," would
"rob the spirit" of their child, thus violating their religious beliefs. 10 2
Although certainly a case of accidental interference, the Court
expressly declined to subject the interference to the test employed in
Yoder. 103 Two considerations animated the Court's reasoning. First, it
stated,
Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the
Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her
spiritual development or that of his or her family .... Roy may no more prevail on his
religious objection to the Government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter
than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Government's
filing cabinets. 104
Second, it contrasted the nature of the interference at issue-the
denial of benefits-with the nature of the interference in cases such as
Yoder and Lee, in which the state had comlielled religious objectors to
engage in conduct that they found objectionable. 10 5
Likewise, in Lyng, the Court declined to require the National
Forest Service to put forth a compelling justification for its decision to
build a road through and harvest timber from a national forest used
by Native American tribes as a sacred religious site. 10 6 Citing Roy, the
Court again emphasized that the petitioner's objection to the
government's proposed actions would be to dictate the government's
internal procedures-in this case, how to use its own land.10 7 Like the
Roy Court, it also distinguished between governmental programs that
may simply make it more difficult to practice a particular religion and
those that directly coerce individuals to violate their religious
beliefs.108
Both Roy and Lyng relied on these two factors to avoid
requiring the government to satisfy strict scrutiny. But once again, it
was not necessary to create a special class of situations in which the
102. 476 U.S. 693, 695-96 (1986).
103. Id. at 707.
104. Id. at 699-700.
105. Id. at 703. Of course, such a distinction brought into question the result reached in
cases such as Sherbert and Thomas v. Review Board. Although the Court continued to affirm
these decisions, it devoted little discussion to distinguishing them from the case at bar. See id. at
706-07.
106. 485 U.S. 439, 442-43 (1998).
107. Id. at 453.
108. Id. at 450-51.
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Sherbert test would not apply. Rather, these factors could have been
relevant considerations in ultimately finding the burden on religious
claimant to be altogether minimal, and thus identical results could
have been reached under the intermediate balancing standard
discussed above.
Perhaps at this point, the Court's continued invocation of the
compelling interest test would not be troubling if one believed that the
Court nevertheless reached the proper result in each case. 10 9 But the
intermediate and reasonable standard that had emerged from these
cases lasted only a few years before ultimately meeting its demise in
the seismic shift that was Smith.
B. Employment Division v. Smith
In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith, the Court once
again faced an accidental interference case in which it was asked to
apply strict scrutiny to the alleged burden on religious practice. 110 Yet,
rather than recognize the implicit standard that governed the
previous cases, Smith rejected the Sherbert test and reinstated what
one commentator has called the "constitutionally insensitive doctrine
of Gobitis."11'
In Smith, two members of the Native American Church were
fired from their jobs at a drug rehabilitation clinic after ingesting
peyote at a religious ceremony. 112 Oregon denied the fired individuals
unemployment compensation, concluding that their dismissal for
illegal drug use constituted work-related "misconduct." 113 Although
technically the challenge was to the denial of unemployment
compensation, and thus should have been governed by the result in
Sherbert and Thomas, the Court, per Justice Scalia, instead chose to
address the case under the broader issue of the extent to which the
state could criminally ban the use of peyote in light of its ceremonial
use in the Native American religion.114 The Court declined to subject
109. In this regard, the author differs from Thomas Berg, who views the progression of the
Sherbert line as one in which the Court was continually watering down its protection for
accidental interferences. See Berg, supra note 18, at 3, 9-11. I, on the other hand, believe that
each case in the Sherbert line was, in fact, subjected to the same standard and reached the
correct result, interpreting the failure rate of religious claimants in the latter cases to be
indicative more of a weak case for constitutionally compelled exemptions than a weakening
standard of protection.
110. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
111. McCoy, supra note 2, at 1346.
112. 494 U.S. at 874.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 876.
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the criminal ban to strict scrutiny and upheld the Oregon law as
constitutional. Moreover, the Court proclaimed that it "[has] never
held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance
with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free
to regulate."115
To reconcile such an assertion with prior case law, the Court
engaged in a series of clever, albeit disingenuous, distinctions. Citing
Sherbert, it stated, "We have never invalidated any governmental
action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of
unemployment compensation."11 6 The Court distinguished Yoder on
the ground that it belonged to a class of cases involving "hybrid
situation[s]," in which the free exercise challenge was coupled with
another constitutional protection, such as freedom of speech 1 7 or, as
in Yoder, the right of parents to direct the education of their
children. 18 Cases such as Lee, which directly invoked Sherbert's
"compelling interest" language, were distinguished on the ground that
while the Court had "sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test
in contexts other than [unemployment compensation], [it has] always
found the test satisfied." 19 Finally, the Court cited Goldman,
115. Id. at 878-79.
116. Id. at 883 (citing Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 699 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
117. Id. at 881 (citing Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940)).
118. Id. (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972)). It seems quite unlikely that Justice Scalia actually meant to recognize such a
category of "hybrid rights," in the sense that a claim for religious interference coupled with a
second speech or parental interference would receive constitutional protection, even if the second
claim could not stand on its own. Rather, such a classification appears only instrumental in
allowing the Court to distinguish prior cases such as Yoder without overruling them. See Thomas
C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation, and Why They Are Wrong, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 417-18 (1999). Moreover, the fact that Justice Scalia has argued
(unsuccessfully) that accidental interference with speech should also pose no constitutional
problem, see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 578-79 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring),
casts doubt on the sincerity of his desire to protect accidental interference with religion simply
because it is combined with speech. See also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(questioning the tenability of the hybrid rights distinction drawn in Smith); Kissinger v. Bd. of
Trustees, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993). But see Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165
F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
119. 494 U.S. at 883. Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, rightfully objected to this kind
reasoning, stating that "it is surely unusual to judge the vitality of a constitutional doctrine by
looking to the win-loss record of the plaintiffs who happen to come before us." Id. at 897
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Shabazz, Roy, and Lyng for the proposition that recently it had
abstained from applying the Sherbert test at all.120
Having distinguished almost the entire Sherbert line, the Court
went on to unequivocally reject the compelling governmental interest
test as the standard by which accidental interferences with religion
were to be resolved. Citing Gobitis, the Court stated, "The mere
possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant
concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the
discharge of political responsibilities."121 In fact, Justice Scalia pointed
out that the compelling governmental interest test supposedly set
forth in the Sherbert line was "not remotely comparable" to the
standard employed elsewhere, and that "watering it down here would
subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied."122 Thus, the
Court concluded that inadvertent state interference with religion
raised no free exercise problem, no matter how serious the inadvertent
interference and no matter how trivial the state's nonreligious
regulatory objective. 123
Although the decision dealt a blow to religious protection, the
Court's conclusion is understandable. Unlike Goldman and Shabazz,
the Court here could not find a discrete category, like the military or
prison contexts, in which to shield the state from the supposed strict
scrutiny requirement. Nor, as in Roy and Lyng, was the burden on free
exercise so trivial that the Court could excuse applying the Sherbert
test because of the indirect nature of the burden or the government's
right to use its property as it saw fit. Rather, in Smith, the burden
was substantial and undeniable. Religious practitioners were directly
prohibited from engaging in a ceremonial practice 124 and laid no claim
to a right to dictate the government's internal procedures or use of its
property. The regulatory interest necessary to outweigh such a burden
would indeed have to be significant under the implicit or subconscious
balancing test applied in the Sherbert line. Perhaps it would even
need to be "of the highest order," and thus equivalent to a truly
"compelling" interest. Yet, the Court arguably feared giving credence
to a true compelling interest test, for as one commentator put it,
120. Id. at 883-84 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 879 (citing Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940)).
122. Id. at 885-86, 888.
123. McCoy, supra note 2, at 1349-50.
124. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (distinguishing the welfare applicants'
objection to the assignment of a social security number from cases such as Lee and Yoder on the
grounds that "in no sense does [the interference at hand] affirmatively compel appellees, by
threat of sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct or to engage in conduct that
they find objectionable for religious reasons" (internal citations omitted)).
1048 [Vol. 61:3:1027
TOWARD A RFRA THAT WORKS
Under Sherbert, if the compelling interest test were taken seriously, generally
applicable health and welfare regulations would be unconstitutional as applied. This
would be the case whenever such regulations impacted religion, no matter how sound
the state interest (short of compelling), no matter how insignificant the impact on
religion .... and regardless of whether alternative practices were available.., that
would serve [the] religious purposes almost as well as the regulated practice. 1 2 5
As Justice Scalia noted, such a standard indeed might allow
"every citizen to become a law unto himself."126 Thus, if the Court
attempted to discern whether the state's interest in regulating peyote
met a high enough standard to outweigh the significant burden on
religious interests-whether it found that standard met or not-it
might be seen as endorsing a true compelling governmental interest
test. Such a result might set that high standard as precedent, even in
cases involving only trivial interference with free exercise. The Court
reacted to such a dilemma by abandoning the Sherbert doctrine
altogether.
The Court found itself, as one commentator put it, "between
the Scylla of no First Amendment protection against inadvertent
interference and the Charybdis of the paralyzing 'compelling interest'
test applied to every generally applicable health, welfare, and safety
regulation that happens to interfere with some particular individual's
off-beat way of expressing herself."127 Yet, rather than attempt to
"construct a middle course"128 between these two doctrinal extremes
by following the practice (and not the language) of Sherbert and its
progeny, the Court returned to the Scylla of its former precedents. 129
After Smith, the state did not have to assert any particularly
substantial interest to accidentally burden religious conduct, no
matter how great the burden. Sherbert was overruled, and the
"compelling interest" test, whatever it meant, was no more.
125. McCoy, supra note 2, at 1348.
126. 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)).
127. McCoy, supra note 2, at 1363.
128. Id.
129. Actually, Justice Scalia did briefly consider a middle ground, rejecting respondents'
proposal to "requir[e] a 'compelling state interest' only when the conduct prohibited is 'central' to
the individual's religion." Id. at 886. Scalia asserted that it was not the place of judges to
determine the "centrality" of religious beliefs. Id. at 887. Analyzing this proposition, itself, could
consume an entire article and, indeed, has been the subject of much debate. Not wishing,
however, to weigh into this debate, I briefly note that, whatever the merit of this objection, RFRA
now expressly requires judges to evaluate the substantiality of the burden on religious conduct.
See infra text accompanying notes 157-166. Whether deeming a burden "substantial" requires
judges to determine whether a particular practice is "central" to the claimant's religion, as
Justice Scalia contended, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87, or the extent of the burden can be
assessed without such an inquiry, as Justice O'Connor argued, see id. at 906-07, is therefore now
only a secondary matter.
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C. Getting Past Smith
1. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Not surprisingly, Smith drew immediate criticism. Fifty
prominent law professors petitioned the Court for a rehearing of the
case, 130 but the Court denied their request. 131 Congress immediately
began efforts to overturn Smith.132 More than fifty organizations,
many of them traditionally at political odds with each other, joined in
an "unprecedented" joint effort to work for RFRA's passage. 133 RFRA
passed the House on a unanimous voice vote, the Senate followed with
only three votes against passage, and President Clinton signed it into
law shortly thereafter.134
As its name suggests, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
was an attempt to restore the Sherbert test for laws inadvertently
burdening the free exercise of religion. 135 A strikingly brief statute, the
first part sets forth Congress's findings, two of which merit discussion
here. First, the statute explicitly references the Smith decision: "[I]n
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme
Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion."' 36 Second, the findings explicitly reference and endorse the
compelling interest test: "[T]he compelling interest test as set forth in
prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests."' 37 The statute then sets forth the purposes of the Act:
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially
burdened by government. 1
3 8
130. John Gatliff, City of Boerne v. Flores Wrecks RFRA: Searching for Nuggets Among the
Rubble, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 298 (1998).
131. 496 U.S. 913 (1990) (mem.).
132. Gatliff, supra note 130, at 298.
133. Id.; see also Berg, supra note 18, at 12-17 (describing the dynamics of the different
members of the RFRA coalition, and the process by which they eventually brought RFRA to law).
134. Galiff, supra note 130, at 298.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000).
136. Id. § 2000bb(a)(4).
137. Id. § 2000bb(a)(5).
138. Id. § 2000bb(b) (citations omitted).
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Finally, the statute sets forth its substantive protection:
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest. 
13 9
RFRA thus attempted to overrule the Supreme Court's
interpretation in Smith and to restore the "compelling interest test" as
that test was "set forth" in Sherbert and Yoder. Yet, the simple text of
the statute fails to resolve serious questions about its meaning. On the
one hand, the statute's requirement that a government action be the
"least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental
interest" suggests a true compelling governmental interest test, on par
with the test applied in the Court's equal protection jurisprudence. On
the other hand, the Act expressly states that its purpose is to "restore"
the "compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and
Wisconsin v. Yoder."'140 Yet, as detailed above, Sherbert and Yoder did
not set forth a true "compelling interest test," but rather an
intermediate form of scrutiny in which the state's regulatory interests
were merely balanced against the burdens imposed on religious
practice. Hence, it is unclear which "compelling interest test" was
codified in RFRA-a true compelling governmental interest test, or a
watered down compelling governmental interest test? The test
suggested by the language of the Sherbert line, or the test actually
applied in the Sherbert line?
2. RFRA Partially Struck Down: City of Boerne
Unfortunately, before courts could address these questions,
RFRA was partially struck down in the case of City of Boerne v.
Flores.141 In Boerne, the city denied a Catholic Church a permit to
renovate its building because a renovation would run afoul of a local
ordinance preserving historic buildings. 142 The church challenged the
denial under RFRA. 143 While not settling the issue of whether the
city's actions did in fact violate RFRA-and thus addressing the scope
of RFRA's "compelling interest" test-the Court, in a 6-3 decision, held
that RFRA exceeded Congress's power under Section 5 of the
139. Id. § 2000bb-l(b).
140. Id. § 2000bb(b)(1) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
141. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
142. Id. at 511-12.
143. Id. at 512.
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Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as it attempted to regulate state
conduct. 144
The Boerne holding, however, was limited to the issue of
Congress's power to apply RFRA to the states. The question remained
whether RFRA retained brio in the federal arena. Although still an
affront to the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretation in Smith,
RFRA did not face a serious challenge at the federal level because
Congress retained power over the passage of its own laws. Thus,
unless the Court were truly irascible concerning congressional
overruling, it seemed likely that RFRA remained in effect in the
federal arena. This question ultimately was answered affirmatively in
recent case of Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, in which the Court struck down a federal law that
incidentally burdened an obscure religion's ceremonial use of a
hallucinogen. 145
Moreover, the gap in protection from state interferences with
religion left by Boerne has been filled in two ways. First, a number of
states have passed their own Religious Freedom Restoration Acts.146
Most of these mini-RFRAs copy the test from the federal RFRA
verbatim. 147 Second, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"). 148 Under RLUIPA's
land use provision, state and local governments may not substantially
burden the religious exercise of a person (a) in any program that
144. Id. at 536.
145. 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006).
146. As Professor Eugene Volokh reported in his First Amendment casebook, the current
status of state RFRAs as of 2005 was as follows: twelve states (AZ, CT, FL, ID, IL, MO, NM, OK,
PA, RI, SC, and TX) have enacted RFRAs by legislation; twelve states (AK, IN, MA, ME, MI,
MN, MT, NC, OH, VT, WA, and WI) have interpreted their state constitutions to require strict
scrutiny for accidental interferences with religion; one state (AL) has implemented a RFRA by
state constitutional amendment; four states (MD, JN, OR, and TN) have rejected strict scrutiny
for accidental interferences with religion under their state constitutions, and have not
legislatively enacted a RFRA; courts in four states (CA, HI, NY, and UT) have noted explicitly
the uncertain legal status of compelled religious exemptions but have thus far declined to resolve
it; and the remaining states (AR, CO, DE, GA, IA, KS, KY, LA, MS, ND, NE, NH, NV, SD, VA,
WV, and WY) have neither had a judicial decision on the subject, nor enacted a state RFRA.
EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES, PROBLEMS, CASES AND
POLICY ARGUMENTS (2d ed. 2005).
147. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01-.05 (LexisNexis 2008); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
35/1-30 (LexisNexis 2008); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. § 110.003 (Vernon 2008). Interestingly
enough, it was the Texas city of Boerne that challenged the federal RFRA in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and was successful in invalidating it as to the states. Also
interesting is the fact that Marci A. Hamilton, counsel for the city of Boerne, has now become a
major critic of constitutional and statutory exemptions for religious objectors. See generally
MARC0 A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAw (2005); see also infra
Part IV.
148. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000)).
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receives federal financial assistance, (b) if the burden would affect
either foreign or interstate commerce, or (c) if the burden results from
zoning or other land use regulations. 149 RLUIPA's institutionalized-
persons provision sets forth protections for institutionalized persons in
much the same manner. 150 Like RFRA, both RLUIPA provisions
require that the state or local government demonstrate that a
religious burden furthers of a compelling governmental interest and is
the least restrictive means of furthering that governmental interest.151
Thus, because of the state RFRAs' and RLUIPA's similarity to the
federal RFRA in terms of their incorporation of a seeming compelling
governmental interest standard, the following analysis of RFRA
should also apply to their interpretation.
III. ARGUING FOR A MODERATE INTERPRETATION OF RFRA
RFRA lends itself to two possible interpretations: a true
compelling governmental interest test or a moderate balancing test.
Because the latter provides the more sensible framework for resolving
accidental interference disputes, and because such a standard will,
perhaps counterintuitively, better protect religious interests, this Note
will offer arguments that support the moderate interpretation. 152
A. Defining "Compelling"
RFRA's invocation of the "compelling interest test" seems, at
first, to settle the matter of the proper standard of review. The term
149. Id. § 2000cc.
150. Id. § 2000cc-1. This section, of course, would dictate the opposite result in cases such as
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), provided that the prison received federal funds.
See supra Part II.A.3.
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Supreme Court upheld the
institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA as constitutional under Congress's Spending
Power, also sustaining its compatibility with the Establishment Clause. 544 U.S. 709, 716, 725-
26 (2005). Although numerous lower courts similarly have upheld the constitutionality of
RLUIPA's land use provision, see, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d
1214, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002), the
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the provision.
152. Many of the interpretive techniques and arguments set forth in this section resemble
those employed by Thomas Berg in his article, What Hath Congress Wrought: An Interpretive
Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra note 18. There is a crucial difference,
however: Professor Berg thinks that the Court had become increasingly unreceptive to religious
claimants in the latter cases along the Sherbert line and, therefore, believes RFRA would do little
to restore religious freedom if it did no more than reinstate the holdings of these pre.Smith
cases. I, by contrast, largely agree with the results reached in these cases and argues that RFRA
will, in fact, best protect religious freedom if it does reinstate the implicit intermediate balancing
standard applied therein.
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''compelling interest," used throughout constitutional law as the first
prong of strict scrutiny, refers to a governmental interest of exceeding
importance that, when advanced by a law that is narrowly tailored to
advance that interest, is sufficient to justify the abridgement of any
constitutional liberty interest. Thus, it seems clear that the standard
set forth in RFRA is the Court's classic strict scrutiny test. But this
interpretation fails to give comparable literal effect to the phrase "as
set forth in Sherbert ... and Yoder."'153 Whatever the meaning of
"compelling interest" in other areas of constitutional law, RFRA
requires the term to find its definition in specific free exercise cases.
In both Sherbert and Yoder, the definition of "compelling
interest" is rather benign. For instance, in Sherbert, the Court
distinguished the invalidated employment compensation policy at
issue from the mandatory Sunday closing law upheld earlier in
Braunfeld because, there, the state succeeded in demonstrating a
"compelling state interest."154 Sherbert therefore would recognize a
governmental interest in a "uniform day of rest" as "compelling" and
RFRA, by incorporating Sherbert, would do so as well. Because such
an interest would not qualify as "compelling" in other areas of law,
such as equal protection or free speech,1 55 it stands to reason that
RFRA does not subject accidental interferences with free exercise to
the classic strict scrutiny standard of constitutional law. Instead, a
lower standard apparently governs.
B. The Problem of Sherbert's Progeny
An appropriate rejoinder to the previous argument is that,
ignoring the state's victory in Braunfeld, the religious claimants in
both Sherbert and Yoder succeeded in obtaining constitutionally
compelled exemptions for their religious conduct. While Sherbert's
approval of Braunfeld does not square with a true compelling
governmental interest test, the result in Sherbert does. If we assume
that Sherbert's discussion of Braunfeld was merely dicta, allowing the
Court to side-step overruling a two-year old decision, and we limit our
purview to Sherbert and Yoder, both of which would have reached the
same result under strict scrutiny, we eliminate the apparent tension
between those cases and the traditional formulation of strict scrutiny.
Perhaps such an interpretation would aid in interpreting the
phrase "prior Federal court rulings" in the following statement of
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(1).
154. 374 U.S. 398, 403, 408 (1963).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
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congressional findings: "[T]he compelling interest test as set forth in
prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests."156 If "prior Federal court rulings" refers to the general body
of federal constitutional law, as opposed to federal rulings concerning
only free exercise, then RFRA indeed instructs courts to look to the
compelling interest test as applied throughout constitutional law.
But removing Braunfeld from the picture raises a bigger
question: Does RFRA only reinstate Sherbert and Yoder, or does it
codify all pre-Smith cases in the Sherbert line? Setting aside other
unemployment compensation cases similar to Sherbert,157 remember
that the only cases in the Sherbert line in which religious claimants
actually succeeded in their request for constitutionally compelled
exemptions were Sherbert itself and Yoder. In all other cases-
Braunfeld,158 Lee, Bob Jones University, Goldman, Shabazz, Roy, and
Lyng-the government ultimately prevailed on an interest that would
not be considered sufficiently "compelling" to justify the abridgement
of other constitutional rights. 159
If RFRA mandates application of strict scrutiny to cases
involving incidental burdens on religious exercise, then RFRA would
not only protect the result in Sherbert and Yoder, but arguably reverse
the result in each of these cases, because the government would not
have been able to satisfy strict scrutiny. The Amish would be
exempted from paying their share of their employees' social security
taxes, Bob Jones University could reinstate its racial dating
restrictions and still maintain its tax exempt status, and the
government would be prohibited from assigning a social security
number to "Little Bird of Snow."1 60
On the other hand, if RFRA preserves the result in these cases,
then it can be certain that RFRA does not institute strict scrutiny for
all case involving accidental interference with religious practice If that
is the case, then we are left with the conclusion either that the phrase
"prior Federal court rulings" refers to Sherbert's progeny or that we
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (emphasis added).
157. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
158. Of course, it is not entirely clear whether Braunfeld, having preceded Sherbert, is
officially considered part of the Sherbert line. Regardless, its inclusion is not essential to
establish the argument advanced, since several other cases in the Sherbert line also resulted in
the denial of the religious objectors' claims.
159. See supra Part II.A.3.
160. It should be noted, however, that these results assume, arguendo, that under RFRA the
burdens upon the claimant's religious exercise would be found to be "substantialU," an additional
argument against strict scrutiny, which I address infra Part III.C.
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simply must accept the tension between applications of the compelling
interest test in different areas of constitutional law.
In addition, according to RFRA, these "prior Federal court
rulings" are to provide guidance as to "striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests." But if strict scrutiny is to be applied, then RFRA's language
concerning "striking sensible balances" remains euphemistic and
without effect. A true compelling governmental interest test is less
about striking balances than it is about granting exceedingly strong
protection for the liberty interest at stake. As Professor Winkler
described, strict scrutiny becomes an act of balancing only after the
liberty interest has been sufficiently weighted such that there is a
strong "thumb on the scale."16 1 Moreover the word "sensible" implies
that the balancing of interests should be a nuanced process. Such a
nuanced approach seems far more akin to the four-factor balancing
test that emerged in the Sherbert line, 162 under which both sides'
interests were carefully evaluated in a kind of "close scrutiny,"' 63 than
of the strict scrutiny standard, which first establishes a presumption
of unconstitutionality before entertaining the government's proffered
interests. 164
C. RFRA's Substantive Provisions
The substantive provisions of RFRA provide the biggest textual
obstacle to interpreting RFRA as setting forth an intermediate
scrutiny standard. RFRA provides that the
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a
161. Winkler, supra note 39, at 803.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75, 101.
163. Berg, supra note 18, at 20 ("[fIt is possible to read the 'compelling interest' standard of
Sherbert and Yoder in a 'moderate' rather than an 'absolute' fashion, as instituting a case-by-case
'close scrutiny' of government actions that harm religion but without setting up a virtual per se
rule against such effects.") (citing William Bentley Ball, Accountability: A View from the Trial
Courtroom, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 809, 812 (1992), for the proposition that the SherbertlYoder
approach was highly "fact intensive").
164. Compare Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying
Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black Victims in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV.
145, 178-79 ('The crucial consequence of subjecting a governmental [racial] classification to
'strict scrutiny' is that the classification then becomes presumptively unconstitutional, and the
burden falls on the government to establish an extremely persuasive justification for use of that
classification (a burden which is essentially never met)." (emphasis added)), with Ira C. Lupu,
Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 64 (1993) (denying that the
SherbertlYoder standard, despite its language, creates an initial presumption of
unconstitutionality).
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compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.165
That courts will uphold these actions only if they further a
''compelling governmental interest" and are the "least restrictive
means" of furthering that interest sounds like the classic strict
scrutiny standard. 166 Yet, this bar for government action is applicable
only in instances in which the government "substantially burden[s] a
person's exercise of religion." The substantiality requirement
immediately sets free exercise jurisprudence apart from other areas of
the law in which the Court has applied strict scrutiny. For instance,
once a court identifies a racial classification it is irrelevant whether
the classification is a minor one,' 67 or one made for benign purposes. 168
The racial classification is the trigger; once found, strict scrutiny
applies. Similarly, content-based restrictions on speech, while
sometimes surviving strict scrutiny, are not immune from the strict
scrutiny inquiry simply because they restrict speech for only a short
time or in only a single location. 169 In contrast, under RFRA, while
requiring the government to put forth an interest deemed "compelling"
places a thumb on the scale in favor of the religious claimant, 170
requiring the claimant to prove that the burden is "substantiall"
places an additional thumb on the opposite side of the scale for the
government, restoring a more genuine balance. So, when we compare
the standards under which the pre-Smith cases operated and under
which RFRA should operate according to its statutory language, we
see that the standards are identical in all but one respect:
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2000).
166. See supra notes 55-62.
167. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2746-47, 2751, 2753 (2007) (subjecting to strict scrutiny a school district's policy to base its
placement of students in part on the students' race, despite the fact that race became a
determinative factor in the decision only after several other considerations, which were often
sufficient, failed to determine the placement decision).
168. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490, 493 (1989) (subjecting
to strict scrutiny a city's race-based remedial system despite its allegedly benign or
compensatory purpose).
169. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193-94, 198 (1992) (subjecting to strict
scrutiny a Tennessee law that prohibited political campaigning within only one hundred feet of a
polling place and only on election day).
170. See supra Part II.A.2.
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Table 1A-Balancing Calculus Before RFRA
Compelling Not Compelling
Substantial Balancing Required Adherent Prevails
NotSubstantial Government Prevails Balancing Required
Table 1B-Balancing Standard After RFRA
Compelling Not Compelling
Substantial Balancing Required Adherent Prevails
Not RFRA Inapplicable: *Goverrunent
Substantial Government Prevails Prevails
Thus, at least in theory, RFRA deviates from the pre-Smith
balancing standard only in cases where both the religious burden and
the governmental interest are weak. In such cases, because the
religious adherent is left without statutory protection, the government
should prevail. However, considering cases such as Lyng, Lee, and
Roy, all of which involved (arguably) only minor burdens on free
exercise that were overcome by governmental interests short of
compelling, perhaps RFRA codifies pre-Smith law even in this fourth
category after all.
Of course, the main objection to this categorical comparison
might be that it is accurate only insofar as it is divided into these four
discrete categories. If, as this Note has argued, Sherbert and its
progeny implemented a true balancing test, then theoretically a
situation in which the government created a burden on religious
practice just shy of "substantial" and in which it attempted to justify
that burden by a truly trivial public interest, would result in a court
finding in favor of the religious claimant. Yet, because RFRA
protections kick in only for religious burdens rising to the level of
"substantial," a court would have to reach the opposite result under
RFRA and find for the government. This argument suffers from two
defects. First, it fails to account for the subjective nature of judging.
The threshold question of whether the claimant has suffered a
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"substantial" burden will be animated and implicitly informed by
examining the extent of the government's proffered interest. Perhaps
a judge or jury would be more likely to consider a burden "substantial"
if the government interest seemed minimal. For this reason, it is not
surprising that in both pre-RFRA and post-RFRA cases in the lower
courts, the major battleground often has been the threshold question
of burden, rather than the balancing that is supposed to take place
thereafter. Courts evaluating the alleged burden have not refrained
from analyzing the strength of the government's interest, even though
such an inquiry technically should be irrelevant until a burden is
found. 171 Second, the "least restrictive means" requirement and any
alternative avenues of religious practice for the claimant (to the
degree that they will be considered in assessing the substantiality of
the alleged burden) should allow for sufficient fluidity between the
categories. This would result in a more flexible ultimate inquiry on
par with that employed in the pre-Smith case law.172
These three considerations-the requirement that the
compelling interest test find its definition in Sherbert and Yoder; the
potential incorporation of Sherbert's progeny, which watered down the
standard for demonstrating a compelling interest; and RFRA's
requirement that the burden on religious conduct be "substantial"-
support an interpretation of RFRA consistent with a moderate
balancing standard, not a classic strict scrutiny analysis.
D. 0 Centro Espirita: A Post-Boerne RFRA Case
Having argued that the Sherbert line sets forth an
intermediate balancing test, and having demonstrated that RFRA is
susceptible to an interpretation consistent with such intermediate
scrutiny, this Note will examine the Supreme Court's first post-Boerne
encounter with RFRA, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente
171. The pre.RFRA (and pre-Smith) case of Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education
provides a good example. Plaintiff public school students and their parents argued that being
required to read and discuss materials that ran contrary to their beliefs violated the students'
right to free exercise. 827 F.2d 1058, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 1987). Although the court analyzed the
alleged burden as a threshold question to be answered before First Amendment guarantees
would kick in, id. at 1063, the court's extensive discussion of the arguments for and against the
presence of a burden also delved into the strength of the government's interest in "teaching
fundamental values essential to a democratic society." Id. at 1068-69 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75, 101 (setting forth the nuanced four-factor
balancing test that the Court uses in cases involving accidental interference with free speech, in
which alternatives available to the government and alternatives available to the claimant are
factors two and four, respectively).
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Uniao do Vegetal, to determine whether the Court has moved in this
direction.
0 Centro Espirita involved the practices of a religious sect
called the 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV).173
Central to the UDV's faith is the practice of receiving communion
through hoasca, a sacramental tea containing the hallucinogenic
substance DMT. 174 DMT is listed in Schedule I of the Controlled
Substances Act 175 and thus is illegal in the United States. In 1999,
United States Customs Inspectors intercepted a shipment of hoasca to
the American UDV and threatened prosecution. 176 The UDV sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Controlled
Substances Act, as applied to the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca,
violated RFRA. 177 The UDV also sought a preliminary injunction
allowing it to continue its use of hoasca pending trial on the merits. 178
At a hearing on the UDV's preliminary injunction motion, the
government conceded that the challenged application would
substantially burden a sincere exercise of religion.1 79 However, the
government argued that it had satisfied RFRA by demonstrating "a
compelling interest in the uniform application of the Controlled
Substances Act, such that no exception to the ban" could be made to
accommodate the UDV's religious practice.180
The Court unanimously affirmed the lower courts' judgment
granting UDV's preliminary injunction and rejected the government's
invocation of the Controlled Substances Act as a compelling
interest.181 The Court stated,
RFRA, and the strict scrutiny test it adopted, contemplate an inquiry more focused than
the Government's categorical approach. RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate
that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law
"to the person"-the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being
substantially burdened. 
18 2
Thus, the government could not simply rely on the assertion
that Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act by definition could
admit of no exceptions, an assertion the Court also noted was
173. 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006).
174. Id. at 425.
175. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) sched. I(c) (2000).
176. 546 U.S. at 425.
177. Id. at 425-26.
178. Id. at 426.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 423.
181. Id. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 439.
182. Id. at 430-31 (citation omitted).
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contradicted by the fact that an exception already had been made for
peyote-also a Schedule I substance-for religious use.183
Although the term "strict scrutiny," like the term "compelling
interest," was not without its misuses in the Sherbert line,'8 4 the
Court's use of the latter term throughout its opinion is significant. In
two of the four instances in which the Court used the term "strict
scrutiny," it did so in citations to cases from other areas of
constitutional law in which there is virtually no dispute as to its
meaning. First, in addressing the proper standard of review for
religious exemption claims under RFRA, the Court cited Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, an equal protection case, for the proposition
that "strict scrutiny does take 'relevant differences' into account."185
Second, in discrediting the government's argument that uniform
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act remains a "compelling
interest" in the abstract, the Court cited Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, a deliberate free exercise interference case, and
Florida Star v. B.J. F., a content-based speech restriction case. The
Court noted that these cases stand for the proposition that in "strict
scrutiny jurisprudence.. . 'a law cannot be regarded as protecting an
interest "of the highest order" . . when it leaves appreciable damage
to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.' "186 Significantly, the
Court drew from three different areas of the law in which strict
scrutiny is applied with its normal rigor. This reliance goes a long way
in advancing the argument that RFRA transformed the supposedly
"cstrict scrutiny" standard in free exercise cases from a level it had
characterized as "not remotely comparable" to that employed
elsewhere18 7 to a level on par with the rest of constitutional law.
Also significant is the fact that the Court took a step in the
opposite direction by seemingly recognizing other cases in the Sherbert
line as consistent with the compelling interest test. The government
contested the Court's rejection of uniformity as a compelling interest
by citing Lee and Braunfeld, both of which had relied on an interest in
the uniform application of laws to reject claims for religious
183. Id. at 433. As the Court noted, while there had been a regulatory exemption for peyote
use by the Native American Church for the past 35 years, it was not until 1994 that Congress
extended the exemption to members of all recognized tribes. Id.; see also infra note 193 and
accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)
(citing Sherbert for the proposition that accidental interferences with religion "must be subjected
to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest").
185. 0 Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 431-32 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995)).
186. 0 Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 433 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S.
520, 547 (1993), and Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989)).
187. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-86 (1990).
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exemptions. 88 In Lee, the Court found a state interest in not allowing
"myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of beliefs" sufficient to
justify the burden of imposing social security taxes upon religiously
objecting employers. 8 9 Yet, as explained above, such an interest could
not survive classic application of strict scrutiny because "it is
axiomatic that financial concerns never rise to the level of a
'compelling interest.' "190 Nor, as also demonstrated above, could a
state interest in a "uniform day of rest."' 91 If RFRA brings strict
scrutiny in free exercise cases in line with the rest of constitutional
law, these cases should provide no authority regarding what interests
may be "compelling." Yet, rather than dismiss them accordingly, the
Court implicitly affirmed their validity, stating that "[t]hese cases
show that the Government can demonstrate a compelling interest in
uniform application of a particular program by offering evidence that
granting the requested religious accommodations would seriously
compromise its ability to administer the program."192 The Court held
that nevertheless, the government had not demonstrated a similar
danger for the exemption at issue.
Thus, by incorporating other cases in the Sherbert line, cases in
which a watered down compelling governmental interest standard was
used, the Court demonstrated either that it views RFRA as codifying
the intermediate standard set forth in this Note or that it remains
conflicted about the proper standard of review. Suffice it to say that 0
Centro Espirita, far from resolving the ultimate issue, keeps the
debate alive, and thus continues to provide religious claimants with
an opportunity to steer RFRA's interpretation in an advantageous
manner.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ANALYSIS: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
While this Note's analysis concerning the standard of review
set forth in free exercise case law and RFRA may seem to split hairs, a
firm grasp of this issue is crucial to the ability of RFRA's supporters to
accomplish their goals. Smith easily could have come out the same
way without overruling Sherbert. Employing a simple balancing test,
the Court could have concluded that the state's regulatory interest in
preventing the health and diversion risks attending an exception for
188. 0 Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 435.
189. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982).
190. McCoy, supra note 2, at 1348 n.44.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 154-155.
192. 0 Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added).
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the use of peyote outweighed the burden imposed on Native
Americans in being denied unemployment compensation. Yet, it would
also have been reasonable for the Court to have sided with the Native
American interests at stake. If to forbid peyote use was indeed a
substantial burden on the free exercise of Native American Religion,
then perhaps the government's interest in uniform regulation should
not have been enough. That such an argument had merit was
demonstrated four years later, when Congress provided explicit
statutory authorization for peyote use in the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act.' 93
Respondents could have used this intermediate balancing
argument to persuade the Court to decide in their favor. Instead, both
respondents and their amici-religious organizations such as the
American Jewish Congress and the Council on Religious Freedom-
argued for a true compelling governmental interest test, seizing upon
every piece of language in the Sherbert line that lent support to such a
standard. 194 This demanding standard faced opposition from the
Smith Court: "Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when
otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious
convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free
from governmental regulation."195 The Court therefore concluded that
the state need assert no particularly substantial interest to burden
religion. In many ways, respondents and their amici, by asking for too
much, may have effectively shot themselves in the foot.
Likewise, attacks on RFRA capitalize on the seeming strict
scrutiny standard to (quite convincingly) hypothesize absurd and
alarming results that would follow from taking such a standard
seriously. Professor Marci A. Hamilton, who successfully argued
against RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores,196 provides several such
carefully crafted hypothetical scenarios in her article, How Much
193. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994).
194. See, e.g., Brief of American Jewish Congress as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 23-27, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-1213), 1989 WVL 1126849
("[G]overnment cannot rely on theoretical interests when its laws infringe on an individual's
most basic right to religious liberty. 'Only an especially important governmental interest
pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice of First Amendment
freedoms .. ' " (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 728 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
195. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
196. See supra Part II.C.2.
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Protection Does Religion Need?197 For example, criticizing the bill that
would eventually become RLUIPA, 198 she writes,
How would the [standard] apply when a religious believer beats (poisons, refuses
medical treatment for or refuses to feed) his wife and children as part of his religion, and
the family ends up at a shelter or county hospital that receives federal tax dollars? If the
believer, in line with his religious beliefs, demands them back, the courts would have to
determine which arrangement is the least restrictive means of serving the government's
interest in the wife's and children's safety. It would be less restrictive to post a
policeman in the house than to keep the family away from the believer, even though the
societal cost would be immense. 199
Perhaps arguments like this were persuasive to former
California governor Pete Wilson, who ultimately vetoed California's
proposed RFRA, commenting,
Unfortunately, this bill would go further than the compelling interest test utilized by
the courts before Employment Division v. Smith and would create a means to challenge
facially neutral laws by prisoners, criminal defendants, and others.
2 0 0
Poorly drafted, it sets standards for assessing the validity of laws which would have
untold consequences not contemplated by its supporters: It would engender litigation by
prisoners and criminal defendants alike, who claim that the laws which protect and
preserve order burden their religious beliefs. It would open up the prospect of
invalidating laws ranging from the payment of taxes to compulsory vaccination laws, to
drug laws, to land use laws, to laws against racial discrimination.
20 1
[Under] the bill, criminal defendants could raise religious objections to drug laws, seek
to justify domestic violence based on a purported religious belief that wives should be
submissive to their husbands, and could seek to resurrect the diminished capacity
defense for defendants who are under the influence of drugs when they commit crimes.
In each case, the State would have to show that these criminal laws are the "least
restrictive means" of furthering its compelling interests in these laws. While no one can
predict the outcome of these challenges, we can predict that law enforcement will be
thwarted, delayed, and consumed in litigation.
20 2
While such attacks are certainly hyperbolic-after fifteen years
of RFRA in federal law and the enactment of at least twelve state
RFRAs, 20 3 no such parade of horribles has occurred-they are no doubt
theoretically consistent with a true compelling interest test. Thus, by
197. Marci A. Hamilton, How Much Protection Does Religion Need?, 115 CHRISTIAN CENTURY
686 (1998). Actually, Professor Hamilton goes further by characterizing RFRA as requiring what
she calls "superstrict scrutiny." Id. at 686.
198. As noted above, because the standard of review iihposed in RLUIPA is identical to that
of RFRA, see supra text accompanying note 151, Professor Hamilton's criticisms apply equally to
RFRA.
199. Hamilton, supra note 197, at 687.
200. Governor Pete Wilson, Veto Message-Assembly Bill No. 1617 (Sept. 28, 1998), 1997-98
CAL. ASSEMBLY J. (REGULAR SESSION) 9647, 9478 (Recess Journal No. 26, Oct. 1, 1998).
201. Id. at 9647.
202. Id. at 9649.
203. See supra note 146.
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insisting on a true compelling interest test, religious claimants risk
inviting precisely this kind of reactionary response. Of course, if the
fate of the California RFRA or the result in Smith provides guidance,
the likely result of a successful backlash would not be a slight easing
of the standard of protection, but an elimination of any standard
whatsoever. Hence, by asking for too much, religious claimants risk
losing it all.
Instead, religious claimants should seek the middle ground of a
reasonable balancing test between the state's regulatory interest and
the degree of burden on free exercise, the test that emerged in the
Sherbert line of cases. Religious claimants should seek this middle
ground in two ways. First, in arguing RFRA and RLUIPA cases, they
should advance an interpretation of "compelling interest" as that test
was "set forth" in Sherbert, Yoder, and its progeny-that is, not a true
compelling governmental interest test, but an intermediate balancing
test. This approach will decrease hostility to what otherwise might
prove an extreme interpretation and application of RFRA and will
minimize the likelihood of RFRA's repeal through the political process.
Second, they should enact mini-RFRAs that expressly and
unequivocally adopt a balancing test like the one described in this
Note. It would be best to eschew reference to Sherbert, Yoder, or any
other cases in that line and not to employ the term "compelling
interest." Rather, the statute could accomplish this purpose by stating
that all state laws incidentally burdening the free exercise of religion
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny in which the state's
regulatory interest is to be weighed against the burden on the citizen's
religious practice, accounting for possible alternative avenues on both
sides. As in RFRA, the statute should provide that any defendant may
raise this requirement as a defense in a criminal or civil proceeding. 20 4
VI. CONCLUSION
From the 1960s through the '80s, the Supreme Court refined a
sensible and workable test for resolving the question of accidental
regulatory interference with religion. Through Sherbert v. Verner and
its progeny, the Court arrived at an intermediate form of scrutiny in
which, some of its language notwithstanding, the state's regulatory
interests were weighed against the alleged burdens on the petitioner's
religious practices while accounting for feasible alternatives for both
sides. Unfortunately, that finely wrought balance was destroyed in
Employment Division v. Smith, in which the Court held that the state
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (2000).
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need demonstrate no particularly compelling interest should a facially
neutral uniform law incidentally burden religion. This dismantling of
the Sherbert doctrine was the unfortunate result of Sherbert's
hyperbolic rhetoric of the "compelling governmental interest" test, an
extreme and seldom met standard. Congress responded by enacting
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which attempted to restore the
pre-Smith understanding of accidental interference. Although RFRA
was struck down as unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of
Boerne v. Flores, RFRA continues to have force with respect to federal
laws. RFRA's text admits of two possible interpretations, one being a
true form of strict scrutiny, as that test is applied in other areas of
constitutional law, and the other being the balancing test actually
applied in the Sherbert line of cases. Because a true compelling
governmental interest test is so extreme that it invites a backlash
akin to Smith, religious claimants should take advantage of the
current definitional ambiguity in RFRA to steer its interpretation
toward the balancing test applied in Sherbert and away from a true
compelling governmental interest test. Such an interpretation of
RFRA is not only the optimum approach to accidental interference
jurisprudence, but it also is the approach most likely to enjoy
continued acceptance in the law, and therefore the most likely to
provide the best protection for religious interests in the long run.
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